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Digital Reflective Judgement:  
A Kantian Perspective on Software  
 




In this paper, I formulate an analysis of software from a Kantian 
perspective. The central thesis is that software is a form of reflective 
judgment, namely, “digital reflective judgement”. This transcendental 
approach allows us to overcome the limitations of an overly dualistic 
and over-intellectualized conception of software. The paper is 
structured as follows. In section 2, I develop a series of criticisms of 
Turner’s (2018) approach. Turner defines software as a 
computational artifact and distinguishes two series of its properties: 
functional and structural. I argue that this distinction cannot be 
applied to software and that Turner’s approach cannot explain the 
essence of software, namely, its twofold nature—abstract and 
concrete—at the same time. Moreover, Turner’s perspective is 
characterized by some philosophical limitations. In sections 3 and 4, I 
present a proposed definition of software from a transcendental 
Kantian perspective, that is, by using the concept of reflective 
judgment. In section 5, I explain why and how we can consider 
software as a new form of reflective judgment. This judgement is 
based on a specific type of imaginative act that mediates between 
physical implementations and mathematical structures. In section 6, 
through a parallelism between software and the Kantian judgment of 
taste, I hold that the condition of possibility of software is the 
principle of finality, which is shown in the design. Software is, above 
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all, a design act. In the conclusion, I show why this approach 
overcomes Turner’s limitations and is much closer to how 
programmers conceive their work. 




The central issue of this paper can be described in the following way:  
 
A central topic in the philosophy of computer science con-
cerns the ontological status of programs. While algorithms 
are generally taken to be mathematical objects, the nature 
of programs is less clear, although semantic concerns are 
central: their ontological status is closely allied to their se-
mantic status. In particular, a semantic account of pro-
gramming languages is taken to involve a machine of some 
kind. But what kind of machine? Is it abstract or concrete? If 
a physical machine is taken to fix the meaning, then seman-
tically and ontologically, programs are primarily physical de-
vices. Conversely, if an abstract machine is employed, then 
programs are abstract in nature. However, the nature of 
programs is not so easily and neatly settled: both abstract 
and physical devices seem to be involved (Turner 2018: 
15).  
 
The central thesis of this paper is that the ontological issues re-
lated to software have to be re-formulated from a Kantian perspec-
tive. I propose a thinking of software as a form of reflective judg-
ment. I claim that this transcendental approach will allow us to over-
come the limitations of a dualistic and over-intellectualized concep-
tion of software as well as understand other dimensions of software 
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that a merely technical explanation invariably misses. My goal is not 
to give a comprehensive definition of software. I think that software 
is an overly elusive and complex phenomenon, and a univocal defini-
tion inevitably makes us lose its multistability (see Ihde 1990). In-
stead, my goal is to define the conditions of a philosophical analysis 
of software as a way of understanding this multistability. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I develop a 
series of criticisms of Turner’s (2018) approach. Turner defines 
software as a computational artifact and distinguishes two series of 
its properties: functional and structural. I argue that this distinction 
cannot be applied to software and that Turner’s approach cannot 
explain the essence of software, namely, its twofold nature—abstract 
and concrete—at the same time. Moreover, Turner’s perspective is 
characterized by some philosophical limitations. 
Consequently, in section 3 and 4, I present a proposed definition 
of software from a transcendental Kantian perspective, i.e., by using 
the concept of reflective judgment. Turner fails to solve the question 
of the ontological status of software because of the overly strict 
manner in which he connects ontology and semantics. Reformulating 
the ontological question in transcendental and aesthetic terms gives 
us the possibility of escaping Turner’s limitations and explaining the 
plastic and dynamic nature of software. 
In section 5, I explain why and how we can consider software as 
a new form of reflective judgment. My claim is that this judgement is 
based on a particular type of imaginative act that mediates between 
physical implementations and mathematical structures. This 
imaginative act is based on some synthetical structures, i.e., specific 
forms of writing. Software programming is essentially an art of 
writing.  
In section 6, through a parallelism between software and the 
Kantian judgment of taste, I hold that the condition of possibility of 
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software is the principle of finality, which is shown in the design. 
Software is, above all, a design act. In the conclusion, I show why 
this approach overcomes Turner’s limitations and is much closer to 
how programmers conceive their work. 
 
2. The Problem of the Synthesis 
According to Turner (2018),  
 
Languages and machines represent the two ends of the 
computational spectrum: the abstract and the physical. 
They come together at the digital interface, the very lowest 
level in the computational realm. Digital circuits are em-
ployed to store, communicate, and manipulate data. Flip-
flops, counters, converters, and memory circuits are com-
mon examples. Their building blocks are called gates, the 
most central of which correspond to arithmetic and Boolean 
operations. These are simple logic machines, so named be-
cause they are intended to represent some form of numeri-
cal or Boolean operation. More complex machines are built 
from them by connecting and composing them in various 
ways, where the most general-purpose register-transfer log-
ic machine is a computer. 
 
Even though Turner’s book remains an important reference point 
in computer science philosophy, this view appears to be 
oversimplified. I contend that Turner does not grasp the complexity of 
the philosophical problem underlying his premise. Let us try to 
correctly formulate this problem: how is the a priori synthesis of 
Boolean operations and machines possible? This synthesis is a priori 
because it is the condition of possibility of all our digital experiences 
and is independent of these experiences (the computer also acts in 
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my absence and performs these operations). Moreover, what does the 
synthesis between the machine, Boolean operations, and user 
experience guarantee? How can we know that this correspondence 
takes place?  
Boolean logic truth tables give us a functional description of a 
digital circuit. This description is formulated in a formal language and 
says how the digital circuit should work. However, the digital circuit is 
also a physical object, i.e., a set of material and electrical pulses. As a 
physical object, the electrical circuit has a series of structural 
properties that tell us what it is and what it does (Turner 2018, 33), 
but the functional and physical properties are incompatible.1 In fact, 
the functional properties “provide no account of how the actual 
electronic devices are to be built; they do not describe how the 
computations are to be carried out. They are functional specifications, 
not [physical] ones, and they cannot be easily turned into the latter. 
They tell us what the actual physical device should do: the what not 
the how” (Turner 2018: 33). Functional and physical properties are 
also incompatible with the characteristics of user experience, which 
incidentally may have knowledge of neither of them.2 
In chapter five of his book, Turner talks about software ontology. 
He distinguishes between functional description (specifications), 
structural description (HL languages), and physical description 
(implementation). According to him, “in the case of programs, 
 
1 “Technical artifacts are, at least prima facie, always physical objects, but they are 
also objects that have a certain function. Looked upon merely as physical objects 
they fit into the physical or material conception of the world. Looked upon as func-
tional objects, however, they do not. The concept of function does not appear in 
physical description of the world; it rather belongs to the intentional conceptualiza-
tion. Technical artifacts thus have a dual nature: they cannot exhaustively be de-
scribed within the physical conceptualization, since this has no place for their func-
tional features, nor can they be described exhaustively within the intentional con-
ceptualization, since their functionality must be realized in an adequate physical 
structure” (Kroes and Meijers 2002). 
2 Turner talk also about “structural properties” defined by a designer using another 
specific formal language. 
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implementation is a mechanism that, given a symbolic program as 
input, returns a physical process” (49). As computational artifacts, 
programs mediate between functional and physical properties, yet 
Turner fails to explain how.   
He does not see a problem in this transition from the symbolic to 
the physical. Software is a complex abstract structure, made up of 
many levels and languages and levels of abstractions, which is 
capable of producing a physical effect. It is a language that does what 
it says. It has a performativity that is independent of any human 
intervention. How, therefore, is it possible for a symbolic apparatus to 
produce a physical effect? How can an abstract mathematical 
structure (see Indurkhya 2017) implement physical operations? 
Turner limits himself to quoting Colburn’s (1999) well-known thesis 
about “harmony”, according to which there is a “fundamental 
harmony” between the physical and the symbolic in the program. 
However, this is not an explanation at all. In Colburn’s vision, the 
programmer appears like the deus ex machina that harmonizes the 
symbolic and the physical, allowing the machine to function. Colburn 
(1999: 17) speaks of “pre-established harmony”, namely, a 
parallelism between the code and machine, established not by God 
but by the programmer. “Programmers today can live almost 
exclusively in the abstract realm of their software descriptions, but 
since their creations have parallel lives as bouncing electrons, theirs 
is a world of concrete abstractions” (18). Turner seems to actualize 
Colburn’s solution by saying that, “presumably, it is via the semantics 
that the programmer is able to design the program from the 
specification, and it is via the semantics that the programmer is able 
to explain why and justify the claim that the program meets the 
specification” and, so, the implementations (Turner 2018: 51). He 
distinguishes three levels—syntax, semantics, and implementation—
and thinks that the passage from the first to the third is due to the 
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second.  
Let us consider Turner’s (99–100) example. We have the 
following formula: 
A: = 13 + 74 
This string of code can receive a “physical interpretation” that 
will have the following form: 
physical memory location A receives the value of physically 
computing 13 plus 74. 
However, what does “physical interpretation” mean? In reality, 
this interpretation is just another linguistic formulation of that string 
of code, i.e., its translation into another language. That string of code 
corresponds to a certain state of the CPU and, therefore, to a series 
of operations, i.e., physical states—what the machine actually does. 
The correspondence is ensured by the programmer’s semantic 
choices. Nevertheless, as Turner claims, a semantic explanation 
concerns only the functional level; it cannot tell us anything about the 
physical operations of the machine. A physical explanation concerns 
only the structural and physical levels, i.e., how the machine 
effectively acts, and it cannot tell us anything about how the machine 
should act. Neither the functional nor the structural levels have the 
resources to explain their connection. In other words, the connection 
sought can be neither functional nor structural nor physical. Turner 
(101) limits himself to saying that “the physical implementation is 
subject to the abstract interpretation, and the meaning of the 
construct is given by the abstract account alone”. He still does not see 
the complexity of the problem of the connection of levels or of the 
relationship between the different levels and user experience.  
I make four fundamental criticisms of Turner’s approach: 
• He does not consider the problem of the interaction, i.e., 
the relation with user experience; 
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• The basis of his theory is an ontology of the thing and not 
of the process—for this reason, he defines software as an object, 
an artifact—but I do not think that this is appropriate to explain 
software; 
• His is an excessive intellectualization of software. 
Let us try to clarify the problem. We have three distinct 
levels: 
The functional level → formal syntax and semantics 
The physical level/1 → implementation/problem-solving 
The physical level/2 → user experience. 
Neither a monistic solution (all levels can be reduced to one; 
they form a unitary whole) nor a dualistic solution (the physical and 
abstract are two distinct and non-communicating levels) appear 
satisfactory. If we choose the first solution, we have to explain the 
differences between these levels. If we choose the second way, we 
must explain the unity of these levels. Turner chooses the second way, 
which is the reason he is forced to invoke an inexplicable “harmony”. 
He also refers to Landin’s correspondence principle (170–171), but 
this changes nothing. Separating the functional level from the 
physical level is only an intellectual abstraction. All the levels are 
connected in the digital experience: user experience is a continuum. 
When I use my laptop, I do not have many different experiences—
one of the functional level, another of the structural level, another of 
the physical machine, etc. My digital experience is uniform. Thus, my 
question is: how is this continuum possible? My belief is that we need 
to re-formulate the ontological question of software in a 
transcendental way. In the next sections, I will try to develop this 
approach by following the analogy between software and the Kantian 
reflective judgment.  
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3. The Kantian Reflective Judgment 
According to Kant, a “judgment” (Urteil) is a specific kind of 
“cognition” (Erkenntnis), i.e., a conscious mental representation of an 
object (Critique of the Pure Reason, A320/B376).3 This representation 
has a synthetic form: it unifies and organizes raw, unstructured 
sensory data according to universal concepts, rules, or principles. 
Judgement is essentially the faculty of thinking of the “particular” 
(the representation of a singular thing) as being contained under the 
“universal” (the general representation). This synthesis is the 
characteristic output of the “power of judgment” (Urteilskraft). The 
power of judgment is a cognitive “capacity” (Fähigkeit), more 
specifically, a spontaneous and innate cognitive capacity. By virtue of 
this, it is the “faculty of judging” (Vermögen zu urteilen) (A69/B94), 
which is also the same as the “faculty of thinking” (Vermögen zu 
denken) (A81/B106). It is a controverted question whether, according 
to Kant, there is only one kind of synthesis or many different kinds. 
Moreover, terms such as “spontaneity” or “concept” can have 
different meanings in Kant’s works. These issues are closely linked to 
the recent debate about Kant’s conceptualism vs. Kant’s non-
conceptualism in relation to his theory of judgment and the ensuing 
implications for interpreting and critically evaluating his 
transcendental idealism and the “Transcendental Deduction of the 
Pure Concepts of the Understanding” (see Hanna 2001, 2006, 2005, 
2017; Land 2011, 2015, 2016; Ginsborg 2006). However, I do not 
want to tackle these issues here. 
I want to stress three points. First, for Kant, judgments are 
essentially propositional cognitions—from which it immediately 
follows that rational humans are, more precisely, propositional 
 
3  I quote using the relevant volume and page number from the standard 
“Akademie” edition of Kant’s works: Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the 
Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. 
Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902–). 
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animals. The connection between judgment and language is, 
therefore, essential. 
Second, Kant distinguishes the logical form and the propositional 
content of a judgment. The logical forms are summarized in the 
“table of judgements” (Critique of the Pure Reason, A52–55/B76–79). 
The propositional contents, which are more fundamental than the 
logical forms, are classified according to two conceptual couples: a 
priori/a posteriori, analytical/synthetical. 4  Briefly, the propositional 
content of a judgment can vary along at least three dimensions: (1) 
its relation to sensory content, (2) its relation to the truth-conditions 
of propositions, and (3) its relation to the conditions for objective 
validity.5 
Third, Kant distinguishes between propositional contents and the 
use of propositional contents. It is possible for a rational subject 
to use the same propositional content in different ways. What does 
this mean? The fundamental difference is that between (a) theoretical 
use and (b) non-theoretical use. The first use aims to formulate true 
propositions about the world in order to obtain some knowledge, i.e., 
science. The second use does not aim to formulate true propositions 
about the world; thus, its aim is pragmatic, moral, aesthetic, or 
teleological.  
To specify the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical 
 
4 For the meaning of these expressions in Kant, see Eisler (1994: 48–54). For Kant, 
there are three types of judgment: analytical a priori, synthetic a posteriori, and 
synthetic a priori (see Eisler 1994, 585ss). The supreme principle of all synthetic 
judgments is that “every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the 
synthetic unity of the different intuitions in a possible experience. […] The 
conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and for this they have an 
objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori” (AK III 39-40); “All analytical 
judgments rest entirely on the principle of contradiction and are by nature a priori 
knowledge […]” (AK IV, 266-267). 
5  I am aware that this description is schematic and does not show the real 
complexity of Kant’s thought on this topic. However, what interests me in this 
section is to highlight only the fundamental points of Kant’s theory of judgment and 
then focus on the distinction between determinant and reflective judgment. 
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uses of propositional contents, Kant introduces the distinction 
between “determining” judgment and “reflective” judgment. In the 
first “Introduction” to The Critique of Judgment (1790), he writes: 
 
Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular 
as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, 
principle, or law) is given, then the judgement which 
subsumes the particular under it is determining. This is so 
even where such a judgement is transcendental and, as 
such, provides the conditions a priori in conformity with 
which alone the subsumption under that universal can be 
effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the 
universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is 
simply reflective (Kant 2016: 53).  
 
Here, Kant develops some remarks about the regulative use of 
the ideas of reason, which appeared in the first Critique’s Appendix to 
the “Transcendental Dialectic”, in particular, the distinction between 
“apodictic” and “hypothetical” uses of judgment (A647/B675). The 
difference between the determining and reflective uses of a judgment 
has to do with the way in which the synthetical structure of the 
judgment is interpreted. The determining use presupposes a high-
order representation under which to subsume the particular. It 
determines an individual or narrower concept by using a given 
general “determinable” concept or principle. The reflective use follows 
the opposite way. It presupposes a particular individual or narrower 
concept and advances from it toward a universal or more general 
concept. Thus, the reflective judgment directly invokes the cognitive 
subject’s ability to form higher-order representations through the act 
of reflection (Überlegung) and, consequently, to be rationally self-
conscious or apperceptive. The aesthetic judgment (the judgement of 
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taste) and the teleological judgment are expressions of the reflective 
use of propositional contents. It is worth reading the entire passage 
from the first “Introduction” to The Critique of Judgment: 
 
The determining judgement determines under universal 
transcendental laws furnished by understanding and is 
subsumptive only; the law is marked out for it a priori, and 
it has no need to devise a law for its own guidance to enable 
it to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal. 
But there are such manifold forms of nature, so many 
modifications, as it were, of the universal transcendental 
concepts of nature, left undetermined by the laws furnished 
by pure understanding a priori as above mentioned, and for 
the reason that these laws only touch the general possibility 
of a nature (as an object of sense), that there must needs 
also be laws in this behalf. These laws, being empirical, may 
be contingent as far as the light of our understanding goes, 
but still, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of 
nature requires), they must be regarded as necessary on a 
principle, unknown though it be to us, of the unity of the 
manifold. The reflective judgement which is compelled to 
ascend from the particular in nature to the universal stands, 
therefore, in need of a principle. This principle it cannot 
borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to 
establish just the unity of all empirical principles under 
higher, though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the 
possibility of the systematic subordination of higher and 
lower. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the 
reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to 
itself. It cannot derive it from any other quarter (as it would 
then be a determining judgement). Nor can it prescribe it to 
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nature, for reflection on the laws of nature adjusts itself to 
nature, and not nature to the conditions according to which 
we strive to obtain a concept of it – a concept that is quite 
contingent in respect of these conditions (Kant 2016: 23). 
 
Aesthetic and teleological judgments can only be reflective: they 
do not produce knowledge.6 While determining judgment is based on 
several a priori principles, i.e., the principles of pure reason 
(transcendental logic), which are the basis of objective knowledge, 
reflective judgment has only one a priori transcendental principle—
finality—which is universal and subjective at the same time. 
Therefore, reflective judgment interprets the particular case 
according to finality. It can have two forms: 1) in the first case, the 
principle of finality is applied to the relationship between the subject 
and the representation of the particular case and, therefore, to the 
spontaneous agreement between imagination and understanding, 
which produces a delight—interpreted as a sign of finality; 2) in the 
second case, finality is applied to the organization of nature through 
understanding and reason. In this case, it can only be subjective 
because it cannot be the object of a possible experience, i.e., a 
phenomenon. Through the faculty of judgement, nature is 
represented as if a supreme intelligence had arranged the unity of all 
empirical laws.  
However, the principle of finality is not to be confused with 
practical finality, as we can read in the first “Introduction” to The 
Critique of Judgment: 
 
6 One must not make the mistake of thinking that the Critique of Pure Reason deals 
only with determining judgment and, instead, that the Critique of the Judgment 
deals only with reflective judgment as if, in Kant, there was a clear distinction 
between these two uses of propositional contents. It must be emphasized that Kant, 
in the third Critique, defines aesthetic and teleological judgments as only reflexive 
in the sense that these judgments are entirely reflective. Many other judgments are 
determining and reflective at the same time (Longuenesse 1993: 208–215).   
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[…] this transcendental concept of a finality of nature is 
neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, since it 
attributes nothing at all to the object, i.e., to nature, but 
only represents the unique mode in which we must proceed 
in our reflection upon the objects of nature with a view to 
getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience, 
and so is a subjective principle, i.e., maxim, of judgement. 
For this reason, too, just as if it were a lucky chance that 
favoured us, we are rejoiced (properly speaking, relieved of 
a want) where we meet with such systematic unity under 
merely empirical laws: although we must necessarily 
assume the presence of such a unity, apart from any ability 
on our part to apprehend or prove its existence (emphasis 
added) (Kant 2016: 46). 
 
The principle of finality is the essence of the faculty of judgment 
as an autonomous faculty with respect to understanding and practical 
reason. In the principle of finality, the faculty of judgment gives itself 
a law in order to think about the unity of nature. The faculty of 
judgment presupposes this law in order to obtain an overall view of 
nature that is acceptable to us. Therefore, finality has a hypothetical 
nature. In Logik (§81), Kant describes finality as the “analogon” of 
the logical universality. Thus, the faculty of judgment produces 
inductive and analogical reasoning.7 
Even if it does not have a cognitive function, reflective judgment 
plays a crucial role in science from a heuristic and methodological 
point of view. In the third Critique, Kant emphasizes the need for 
 
7 The problem of analogy in Kant is very complex. I do not want to tackle this issue 
here. In Kant, there are several ways in which the term “analogy” is used. I would 
say that we can distinguish three main meanings: theological, cognitive (the 
analogies of experience), and mathematical. See Callanan (2008).  
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teleological judgment for the study of biology. If the understanding 
explains a coherent physical science based on universal laws, it is not 
sufficient to explain the smallest and simplest living organisms. The 
life of a worm or the growth of a blade of grass can never be 
understood starting from a determining judgment; it can only be 
understood through reflective judgment. Notions such as “gender” or 
“species” have a heuristic and methodological value to the extent that 
they are used in connection with determining judgment. They cannot 
be the basis of synthetic a priori judgments, but they can help in 
explaining what cannot be stated or formulated in synthetic a priori 
judgments.    
 
4. The Digital Reflective Judgement  
I propose that software be conceived from a Kantian perspective, i.e., 
as a kind of reflective judgment. I call this new form of reflective 
judgment “digital reflective judgment” (henceforth DRJ). Why is it 
that software cannot be compared to determining judgement? It can-
not be so compared because its function is not limited to subsuming a 
concrete problem to an abstract computational structure, namely the 
Turing machine. Software is not a mechanical process. 
Let us look closely at what the programmer does. Like reflective 
judgment, software starts from an individual case, i.e., the problem 
to be solved. Software is essentially problem-solving. In order to 
solve a particular problem, the programmer creates a solution, which 
should be universal, i.e., applicable to all such problems. The pro-
grammer has not yet made categories that can be used to subsume 
the particular case/problem. She/he has to invent and create these 
categories. This universal is the set of syntactic and semantic catego-
ries (the high-level language) that the programmer uses to define 
and solve a particular problem. Therefore, the first work of the pro-
grammer is to “translate” the particular problem (drawing, writing, 
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printing, etc.) into an abstract structure. This is not automated work. 
The programmer must choose the language that best works in rela-
tion to the problem she/he faces—for instance, building a website, a 
smartphone app, or a calculation program or creating a data visuali-
zation, etc.—as well as the libraries and best data architecture. This is 
creative work. 
Now, in Kantian terms, the process that leads from the individual 
problem to its re-interpretation in a formal system is completely non-
theoretical. In fact, this process adds nothing to the “heart” of the 
computer, namely, the Turing machine—the computability. Using a 
certain programming language or a certain algorithmic style does 
nothing to influence the behavior of the Turing machine. The Turing 
machine does not understand the high-level language, the particular 
problem, or human reality. The programmer reflects on the problem 
and proposes an algorithmic solution expressed in the high-level lan-
guage. She/he provides an interpretation of the problem and its solu-
tion (the higher-order representation under which to subsume the 
particular). This solution has to be translated into a formal language 
understandable to the Turing machine (the binary language, 1 and 0, 
so-called “machine language”) through a compiler. Nonetheless, the 
Turing machine does not solve that problem or implement that solu-
tion. It only performs a series of logical operations. It does not inter-
act with its environment. It cannot independently solve a concrete 
human problem in the same way that the determining judgment can-
not be used to explain the living organism. The Turing machine can 
solve that problem only if the latter is interpreted and translated in a 
certain language and rules, i.e., in a certain computational architec-
ture.8  
 
8 Computable functions are precisely those computable by lambda terms or general 
recursive functions. Alonzo Church and Alan Turing published independent papers 
that purported to demonstrate a general solution to the Entscheidungsproblem. A 
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Turner (2018: 67) recognizes this point:  
 
Without programming languages, machines would be idle 
devices much like cars without drivers or hairdressers with-
out combs. […] General problem solving in these [machine] 
languages is difficult and unnatural because control is lim-
ited to instructions for moving data in and out of store, and 
representation is performed using numbers or Boolean val-
ues. These languages are for machines not humans.  
 
Instead, high-level languages, 
 
employ more abstract concepts and control features such as 
procedures, abstract types, functions, polymorphism, rela-
tions, objects, classes, modules, and nondeterminism. 
These concepts aid problem solving and enable a more nat-
ural representation of the problem domain. They operate at 
a distance from the physical machine, and do not depend 
upon the architecture of any specific machine. This is made 
possible by layers of translation and interpretation (67).  
 
This is the essential function of software: allowing the Turing 
machine to interact with the environment and solve concrete prob-
lems. Just as the faculty of judgment exerts a function of mediation 
between nature and understanding, software also mediates between 
 
good number of solutions were proposed that all turned out to be extensionally 
equivalent. Obviously, this is not the place to deal comprehensively with computa-
bility: I refer manly to Turing (1936), Adams (1983), Copeland et al. (2013), Im-
merman (2011), Boolos et al. (2007). Regarding the analogy proposed in this pa-
per, I consider computability as an abstract mathematical structure and software as 
a way of representing and interpreting this structure. I compare computability to 
the Kantian understanding: it is a set of mechanical laws that govern our way of 
thinking about the world. 
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concrete reality and the Turing machine. This is the analogy that I 
propose to develop in the following pages. The art of programming is 
the ability to see how the Turing machine can solve a specific con-
crete problem. All the different parts of programming (HLL, compil-
ers, interpreters, specifications, etc.) are only different ways of bring-
ing the problem and the Turing machine as close as possible. 
In other words, the programmer performs the three fundamental 
operations indicated by Kant in Logik (§6): comparison, reflection, 
and abstraction. She/he compares the concrete problem and the Tu-
ring machine (let us call it its “computational resources”).9 After iden-
tifying the possible connections between the problem and the “com-
putational resources”, she/he reflects on these connections and elab-
orates her/his solution to the problem through the “computational re-
sources” at her/his disposal. This solution is expressed through a 
formal architecture and a physical machine that implements this ar-
chitecture. This solution has an analogical function because it allows 
us to connect the problem and the “computational resources”, the 
concrete, and the abstract. This happens in two ways: a) input – 
software allows us to interpret the concrete problem in computational 
terms and in a language that can be understood by the Turing ma-
chine; b) output – software allows us to interpret the physical electri-
cal impulses produced by the CPU as b.1) the solution of the problem 
or b.2) the physical expressions of the Turing machine abstract oper-
ations. Software reflection allows us to think that the Turing machine 
“solves” that problem, even if this is not the case, because the Turing 
machine does not “see” that problem properly. The problem solved by 
the Turing machine is not “our” problem (print a paper, booking a ho-
tel, read the newspaper, etc.) but a series of mathematical functions. 
 
9 I use the expression “computational resources” here because there are many 
ways to understand computation and many ways to implement it.  
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Software mediation/reflection allows us to think that an abstract 
mathematical structure can implement physical operations.  
 
5. The Software Imagination 
There are two possible objections to the analogy between software 
and Kantian reflective judgment that I try to draw. The first is the 
most immediate: “Software does not have the form of a judgment, of 
a proposition, then we cannot compare software and reflective 
judgment”. Obviously, programming languages are not formulated in 
natural language and, therefore, are not based on the same 
structures as natural language (subject + predicate, as Kant thinks). 
Programming languages are formal and based on a precise syntax or 
grammar. However, if we consider the Kantian notion of judgment in 
more general terms, as a power of synthesis expressed in a certain 
language, then it is possible to reply to the objection. Basically, 
programs are acts of synthesis between different components in 
interaction, thanks to connectors, in order to form a system. Then, 
this formula 
x := x + 1; y := x ∗ y 
is tantamount to a proposition or a set of propositions. We can 
translate strings of code in propositions, or a set of propositions, and 
vice versa. This is the reason why programming languages can be 
understood by humans. 10 
The second possible objection is that our thesis reproduces, even 
if in alternative terms, those of Colburn and Turner: the programmer 
creates the harmony between physical and symbolic, between 
abstract and concrete, as a sort of deus ex machina. This is an 
 
10 The architecture of programs is determined, above all, by the paradigm that the 
programmer decides to follow. It can be imperative (or procedural), functional, logic, 
or object-oriented, each of which is connected to a precise conception of the 
program and of computation. Nevertheless, many languages can be mixed (Turner 
2018: 67–76).  
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important objection because it gives me the opportunity to clarify a 
crucial point. The analogy/mediation of software does not come from 
a creatio ex nihilo in the programmer’s mind. 
Kant can again provide us with an important suggestion: at the 
roots of the three aforementioned operations (comparison, reflection, 
and abstraction) there is the faculty of transcendental imagination. 
The transcendental imagination produces the synthesis between the 
singular and the universal in determining judgment (transcendental 
schematism). It is always the transcendental imagination that 
produces the universal from the individual in the reflective judgment. 
For Kant, the transcendental imagination has a synthetic function that 
precedes and determines judgment and its logical forms.  
I do not want to analyze the Kantian doctrine of imagination, 
which is not the subject of this paper (see Heidegger 1990; Sellars 
1978). I want to formulate another question, which extends the 
comparison between software and reflective judgment that I try to 
formulate: how does the imagination work in software?  
The programmer tackles a concrete problem and fixes 
requirements. Her/his job is to create a formal representation of this 
problem and these requirements. This is an act of imagination: the 
programmer creates an interpretation of the problem, which can be 
understood by the Turing machine. Why should this act be one of 
imagination? It is because the Turing machine and concrete reality 
cannot communicate—the Turing machine cannot understand the 
problem. Therefore, the programmer has to interpret the problem 
and create a new representation of this problem (the program) that 
can mediate between the problem itself and the Turing machine. This 
is an act of imagination.   
Thus, in Kantian terms, the scope of DRJ is to reach a “free 
agreement” between problem, imagination (the program), and 
understanding (the Turing machine). This “free agreement” enables 
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us to “see” the Turing machine as it solves that problem. The 
imagination enables the programmer to “see” how the Turing machine 
can solve the problem, even if the Turing machine cannot “see” the 
problem. Moreover, this agreement has to be effective. It requires 
implementation.  
Given this, the imaginative act of software cannot be a creatio ex 
nihilo. It first has to be technical. This act must respect a series of 
technical constraints: rules, parameters, materials, etc. Furthermore, 
it has to a) express a language, b) have the ability to have a physical 
effect, i.e., to realize a causal action on the underlying material 
reality (the hardware, the instrument, the surrounding environment, 
etc.). 
My hypothesis is that the imaginative act underlying software is 
realized through writing. Why do I choose writing? For two reasons.  
First, software is writing; it is based on writing. For software, to 
be written is not a secondary property; it is its condition of possibility. 
Software would not be software if it were not written. Software is a 
form of writing that is not intended to be read as such; in fact, “for a 
computer, to read is to write elsewhere” (Chun 2013: 91). “Software 
is a special kind of text, and the production of software is a special 
kind of writing” (Sack 2019: 35).  
Second, writing is a specific form of synthesis between the 
abstract and concrete. This is in two different senses: 
• Writing is a synthesis between a language (abstract structures: 
grammar, syntax, semantics) and a material support (paper, 
clay, screen, etc.); 
• Writing is a synthesis between language and space because it 
“spatializes” language, and this spatialization allows the visual-
ization of language and, therefore, a completely new percep-
tive experience of the language. Spatialization and visualiza-
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tion allow the discovery and invention of new uses of language 
and new concepts. 
Writing is the name of a certain type of reason. As Bachimont 
(1996: 7) says:  
 
[…] writing creates a spatial synopsis, allowing to identify 
relations and properties that remain undetectable in the 
linear succession of the temporality of the speech; writing 
shows relations which are not perceptible in orality. Indeed, 
by producing a spatial two-dimensionality of the content of 
the speech, mind can simultaneously access different parts 
of the content independently of the order connecting these 
parts in the oral flow.  
 
Stressing the centrality of writing in knowledge, Bachimont 
(2001) speaks of a “graphical reason”, i.e., a condition of possibility of 
“computational reason”. In doing so, Bachimont extends the results of 
Goody (1977), the anthropologist who most contributed to 
understanding the role of writing in the emergence of certain 
cognitive operations or ways of thinking. In his famous work The 
Domestication of the Savage Mind, Goody (1977) shows the 
differential reasoning between written cultures and so-called oral 
cultures. Indeed, rather than attributing these differences to an axis 
of continuous progress on which oral cultures occupy a position 
inferior to written cultures, the former being an earlier state of the 
second, Goody shows that there are significant differences in thinking 
of the worlds between oral and written cultures and that these 
differences derive from the absence/presence of writing. Goody 
claims that writing has revolutionized human thought by producing 
autonomous conceptual structures and a specific relationship with the 
world. Writing introduces three main conceptual structures: the list, 
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the formula, and the table. They form what we call “the graphical 
reason”.  
I now propose a combination of Bachimont’s (2001) and Goody’s 
(1977) reflections with those of the French designer and graphical 
artist Bertin (1983). In doing so, I distinguish three levels:  
• Diagrammatical reason11 
• Graphical reason  
• Computational reason  
I analyze only the last two levels and distinguish six conceptual 
structures (types of spatial synopsis) to which writing gives rise. I 
summarize them in this table. The structures of computational reason 
are a derivative of those of graphical reason. The first ones were 
described by Goody (1977) and the second by Bachimont (2001) (I 




LIST FORMULA TABLE  
Computational 
reason 




Each of these six structures is the expression of a synthesis 
between a language (a syntax, an alphabet, and a set of rules) and 
space. Each type of programming language comes from the 
interaction between the three conceptual structures of “computational 
reason”. While the three structures in graphical reason (list, formula, 
and table) can work separately, in computational reason, they cannot: 
they must interact. 
The stack is the basic form of data architecture: it allows the 
 
11 I use “diagrammatical reason” because I consider the writing as an evolution of 
the diagram. This is a thesis I am working on in another paper, which I cannot deal 
with extensively in this paper. As for the notion of diagram, I refer mainly to Peirce 
(1992, 1998), Stjernfelt (2007), and Bender and Marrinan (2010). 
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classification and spatial organization of data. The net allows 
communication between different stacks and combines stacks in a 
coherent whole. The string of code activates the relationships 
between the objects in the stacks. For instance, in Java programming 
language, the stacks correspond to classes, which include attributes 
and methods. Each string of code combines a method and an object 
and, therefore, makes the stacks interact through the net. The same 
thing can be said for other types of programming languages. 
My claim is that any syntax and semantics of software language 
presuppose these conceptual structures. When the programmer uses 
terms such as “object”, “operation”, etc., she/he constructs their 
meaning through these syntheses of language and space.  
The programmer could not draw this  
 
or write this  
 
if she/he did not previously have the structures of diagrammatical 
and graphical reason and, then, those of computational reason. The 
art of programming is first an expression of diagrammatical and 
graphical reason. In creating her/his tools, the programmer writes 
formulas and draws schemes—she/he acts like a mathematician or 
logician. However, she/he has to overcome the diagrammatical and 
graphical levels of reason. The program is an evolution of 
diagrammatical and graphical reason. 
The structures of computational reason are placed between the 
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concrete problem and the Turing machine. In other words, they 
mediate the relationship between “understanding” in Kantian terms 
(the Turing machine) and “life” (the concrete problem to solve, the 
implementations, etc.). The functional and physical levels 
communicate, thanks to the mediation of these spatial syntheses. 
Moreover, thanks to its physicality, like writing, software can causally 
act on the physical machine (circuits) and have an effect in the world. 
I am not saying that the synthesis of the functional and physical 
levels is writing, only that it is realized though the spatial syntheses 
made possible by writing. It is thanks to the hybrid (conceptual and 
material) nature of these three spatial syntheses  that we can “see” 
the functional level in the physical, the series of mathematical 
operations in the electrical impulses produced by the CPU, and, 
therefore, the Turing machine solving that problem. 
 
6. The Software Delight   
In the first book of the Critique of Judgement (§1), Kant (2016: 65) 
writes,  
 
If we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, 
we do not refer the representation of it to the object by 
means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by 
means of the imagination (acting perhaps in conjunction 
with understanding) we refer the representation to the 
subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The 
judgement of taste, therefore, is not a cognitive judgement, 
and so not logical, but is aesthetic, which means that it is 
one whose determining ground cannot be other than 
subjective. 
 
The judgement of taste is based on a certain agreement between 
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imagination and understanding. This means that the judgement of 
taste is based on the subject’s feelings, i.e., the manner in which the 
subject is affected by representations. The judgment of taste applies 
the principle of finality to the delight coming from the agreement 
between imagination and understanding, which Kant calls a “free 
play” of faculties. This delight is independent of any interest (see §2). 
In this delight caused by representations, the faculty of judgement 
finds the mark of finality. As Kant (2016: 67) says, 
 
This relation, present when an object is characterized as 
beautiful, is coupled with the feeling of pleasure. This delight is by the 
judgement of taste pronounced valid for everyone; hence an 
agreeableness attending the representation is just as incapable of 
containing the determining ground of the judgement as the 
representation of the perfection of the object or the concept of the 
good. We are thus left with the subjective finality in the 
representation of an object, exclusive of any end (objective or 
subjective) consequently the bare form of finality in the 
representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are 
conscious of it as that which is alone capable of constituting the 
delight which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally 
communicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the 
judgement of taste. 
 
In DRJ, the agreement between imagination and understanding, 
which is realized through writing, delights the programmer. The 
programmer enjoys when the machine runs well and fast and solves 
the problem. This delight is seen as the expression of a finality: the 
machine acts for us and improves our world. Nevertheless, this 
finality is purely subjective. The machine is built by humans and 
responds to human purposes. Software specifications meet human 
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criteria. 
I see here an interesting parallelism between DRJ and the 
Kantian judgement of taste. In both cases, the agreement between 
imagination and understanding generates a delight that is the 
expression of the principle of finality. As we said earlier, the 
fundamental task of a programmer is to translate a problem (the 
singular concrete case) into computational terms (the understanding). 
She/he can do this only by using her/his imagination because there is 
no connection between concrete reality and the Turing machine. The 
programmer has to use her/his imagination. She/he creates the 
universal by which to think about the single individual case and make 
it comprehensible through understanding (the Turing machine). In 
doing so, she/he uses the imaginative structure of writing, the form 
of spatialization, and the materialization of language. The 
programmer reaches her/his scope only when she/he reaches an 
agreement between the concrete problem, her/his imagination, and 
the Turing machine. The program mirrors this agreement, which in 
turn makes the physical machine work and produces a delight. 
Through this delight, DRJ applies the principle of finality.  
In the judgment of taste, the principle of finality is not the result 
of the operation of judging; it is its condition of possibility, namely, 
what guides the power of judging and makes it applicable. The same 
can be said for software. In her/his imaginative work, the 
programmer is oriented and guided by the principle of finality. This 
principle precedes and determines the syntheses of writing between 
the physical and functional levels. It precedes and determines all the 
stages of the programming.   
The main way in which the principle of finality appears in 
programming is the act of design. Programming is essentially a 
design act: “design is everywhere in computer science” (Turner 2018: 
128). The choice of what language to use and the algorithmic style is 
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strictly connected to design choices and is, therefore, aimed at the 
construction of well-designed programs. Design is not just about 
beauty. “Design is a practice of creation turned towards the future 
and supported by an innovative intention” (Vial 2010: 44).  
According to Turner (2018: 161), the hallmarks of a good digital 
design are 1) simplicity, 2) expressive power, and 3) security. 
However, Turner subordinates design to semantics: “More explicitly, 
the things that we may refer to and manipulate, and the processes 
we may call upon to control them, need to be settled before any 
actual syntax is defined. This is the ‘semantics-first principle,’ 
according to which, one does not design a language, and then 
proceed to its semantic definition as a post hoc endeavor; semantics 
must guide design” (169).  
Even on this point, Turner’s analysis appears to be characterized 
by an excessive intellectualization. As the French philosopher 
Stéphane Vial (2010) suggests, the objects of design are objects that 
have been submitted to a process of design, which consists of 
conceiving and producing effects that point to “experiences to be 
lived by means of forms” (115). The effects of design operate on the 
level of form, social meaning, and experience; thus, Vial sees design 
primarily as a “generator of human existence that proposes possible 
experiences” (65). In Vial’s view, design deals not so much with the 
being as with events, not so much with the existing as with the new 
that will emerge. As the French designer Alain Findeli (2010) writes, 
the purpose of design is to improve the habitabilité du monde, i.e., 
our ability to live on this planet. Thus, design has a phenomenological 
and existential function, the aim of which is to improve the interaction 
between machines and humans and, therefore, between humans and 
the world. In this sense, design can be considered an extension of the 
use of Kant’s principle of finality in the judgment of taste. The 
agreement between imagination and understanding produces a 
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delight that is the expression of a finality in nature. Programmers’ 
work makes the interaction between humans and machines possible 
through design as an expression of the principle of finality. Design is 
“a means for human beings to envision and realize new possibilities of 
creating meaning and experience and for giving shape and structure 
to the world through material forms and immaterial effects” 
(Folkmann 2013: 45). 
From this point of view, I claim that design is the condition of 
programs, not the opposite. The programmer does not decide 
abstractly which objects to take into consideration: she/he deals with 
problems and has to choose the best strategy to solve them and give 
them meaning. The design criteria of elegance, correctness, simplicity, 
uniformity, modularity (the process of breaking up complex problems 
into smaller, simpler ones.), transparency, reliability, etc., shape the 
semantic and syntactic of the program. All possible criteria of the 
correctness of software are thought by the programmer through the 
principle of finality, i.e., through design. Writing is the first means by 
which software design is achieved. 
I think that this view is closer to the way in which programmers 
understand their work. “One of the main reasons most computer 
software is so abysmal is that it’s not designed at all, but merely en-
gineered. Another reason is that implementors often place more em-
phasis on a program’s internal construction than on its external de-
sign, despite the fact that as much as 75 per cent of the code in a 
modern program deals with the interface to the user” (Kapor 1996: 
5). Moreover, software is not just a design job. It is also the source of 
a new form of design. “A discipline of software design must train its 
practitioners to be skilled observers of the domain of actions in which 
a particular community of people engage, so that the designers can 
produce software that assists people in performing those actions 
more effectively” (Denning and Dargan 1996: 112).   




In this paper, I developed a series of criticisms of Turner’s approach 
(2018) on software. In order to overcome the limits of Turner’s ap-
proach, I proposed a definition of software from a transcendental 
Kantian perspective, i.e., through the concept of reflective judgment. 
I explain why and how we can consider software as a new form of re-
flective judgment, “digital reflective judgment”. This judgement is re-
alized through a type of imaginative synthesis that mediates between 
physical implementations and mathematical structures. I identified 
these structures as specific forms of writing that I called “graphical 
and computational reasons”, following Goody (1977) and Bachimont 
(2001). Finally, I clarified my approach by showing the parallelism 
between software and the Kantian judgment of taste. In both cases, 
the principle of finality is an a priori condition. 
I think that a Kantian approach to the question of software is a 
good model in explaining the nature of software in accordance with 
the concrete work of programmers. The transcendental approach to 
software avoids the main difficulties of Turner’s approach outlined in 
section 2. In fact, I have shown that a transcendental approach is 
able to 1) explain the interaction between software and users through 
design; 2) escape the overly static framework of an ontology of the 
thing and then support an ontology of the process, which is much 
more suitable in explaining a phenomenon such as software; and 3) 
avoid an excessive intellectualization of software and highlight its 
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